State v. Cornejo Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 45046 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-15-2017
State v. Cornejo Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45046
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Cornejo Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45046" (2017). Not Reported. 3995.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3995
1ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: briefs@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 45046
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-39808
v. )
)
JESUS SALVADOR RAMOS ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
CORNEJO, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Jesus Salvador Ramos Cornejo pled guilty to aggravated battery, the district court
sentenced him to eight years, with four years fixed. Mr. Cornejo appeals. He asserts the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The  State  alleged  Mr.  Cornejo  committed  the  crimes  of  rape,  in  violation  of  I.C  §  18-
6101, and delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a). (R., pp.7–8
(Complaint), 26–27 (Amended Complaint).) Mr. Cornejo waived a preliminary hearing, and the
2magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.25, 28–29.) The State then filed an
Information charging him with rape and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., pp.30–31.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Cornejo pled guilty to an amended charge of aggravated
battery with a deadly instrument, a lanyard, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-903(b), -907(b). (R., pp.50,
51–52, 53–64; Tr., p.15, L.21–p.17, L.5.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of ten years, with five years fixed.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.11–12.) Mr. Cornejo requested probation with a suspended sentence of eight years,
with three years fixed. (Tr., p.27, L.24–p.28, L.1.) The district court sentenced him to eight
years, with four years fixed. (Tr., p.40, Ls.14–16.) The district court declined to place
Mr. Cornejo on probation. (Tr., p.40, Ls.10–12.)
Mr. Cornejo timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.71–
73, 75–76.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with
four years fixed, upon Mr. Cornejo, following his guilty plea to aggravated battery?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight Years,
With Four Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Cornejo, Following His Guilty Plea To Aggravated Battery
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the  burden  of  showing  a  clear  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  court  imposing  the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Cornejo’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-908 (fifteen year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence
3imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Cornejo “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002). Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615
(Ct. App. 1990).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Cornejo asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, including probation, in light
of the mitigating factors, including his family support, work history, and acceptance of
responsibility.
The support and good character letters from Mr. Cornejo’s family provided significant
mitigating information. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (family support and
good character as mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district
court considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstance). Here, nine family
4members submitted letters of support to the district court. (See Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”),1 pp.78, 79, 80, 81–82, 83–84, 273–74, 279–80, 281, 283–85.) Moreover, Mr. Cornejo’s
“entire family” appeared at the sentencing hearing, including his grandmother from California.
(Tr., p.27, Ls.11–12, p.35, Ls.2–3.) His family described him as hardworking, honest, helpful,
respectful, and caring. (PSI, pp.78, 79, 80, 81, 273, 279, 281, 283.) Many of his family members
offered their support. (See PSI,  p.10.)  For  example,  one  of  his  aunts  wrote,  “I  will  always  do
anything  in  my power  to  help  him stay  on  this  feet,  whether  he  needs  a  place  to  stay  or  some
money to help start a career.” (PSI, p.281.) Similarly, Mr. Cornejo’s parents were very
supportive. (PSI, p.10.) He could live with his parents if placed on probation. (PSI, p.11.) He
considered  his  parents  to  be  his  best  friends.  (PSI,  p.10.)  Further,  Mr.  Cornejo  has  a  good
relationship with his ex-wife and his children. (PSI, pp.11, 12.) Mr. Cornejo and his ex-wife
were “discussing reuniting.” (PSI, p.239.) His daughter wrote that Mr. Cornejo “always” had
been there for her and stayed in contact. (PSI, p.83.) She described him as a great father. (PSI,
p.84.) Mr. Cornejo submits the district court failed to adequately consider his family support
when imposing his sentence.
In addition to his family’s support, Mr. Cornejo was employable. See State v. Mitchell, 77
Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating factor); see also
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (employment and desire to advance within company were
mitigating circumstances). He previously worked as a mechanic for Richie’s Auto Care. (PSI,
pp.13–14.) He believed that he could be rehired if placed on probation. (PSI, p.14.) His brother
and sister-in-law also offered him a job as a mechanic at their business. (PSI, p.81.) In addition,
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 285-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
5Mr. Cornejo had experience in management, sales, as a mechanic, and as a forklift driver. (PSI,
p.14.) This positive employment history and future employability stands in favor of mitigation.
Finally, Mr. Cornejo has expressed great remorse for the harm to the victim and accepted
responsibility for the crime. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in
favor of mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. During the presentence interview, Mr. Cornejo
stated, “I am sorry for the things that I have done. I have made a huge mistake. I have hurt this
girl and her family. My family is hurting too because of what I have done. I will not let it happen
again.” (PSI, p.17.) He made similar remarks at sentencing, stating, “I do [want to] apologize for
the victim’s family and her. I [want to] apologize mostly to – to my family and my Grandma. . . .
And I [want to] apologize to my community too. And I just [want to] say I’m sorry for what I’ve
done.” (Tr., p.34, L.25–p.35, L.6.) His attorney also explained, “He is deeply remorseful for the
harm he caused to [the victim], to his family, and to society as a whole . . . .” (Tr., p.29, Ls.5–7.)
In  addition,  Mr.  Cornejo  was  willing  to  participate  in  sexual  offender  treatment.  (PSI,  p.48.)
These statements of acceptance of responsibility and remorse support a lesser sentence, including
probation.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cornejo respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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